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Maturation of intelligent systems technologies and their incorporation into aerial
platforms are dictating the development of new analysis tools and incorporation of such tools
into existing system analysis methodologies in order to fully capture the trade-offs of
autonomy on vehicle and mission success. A first-order “system analysis of autonomy”
methodology is outlined in this paper. Further, this analysis methodology is subsequently
applied to notional high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) aerial vehicle missions.
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ax Coefficients, defined in text
Alt Altitude
ct Percent coverage of target in final data product
(“image”)
cx Coefficients, defined in text
CAS Autonomous System Complexity
CEO Environmental and Operational Complexity
CGCS Cost of ground control station
Cm Cost of mission (if mission prematurely
terminated)
Cv Cost of vehicle (if unexpectedly lost)
DC “Discovery confidence” metric for aerial
explorers
DI “Degree of inaccessibility”
DIN “Degree of interaction” among UAVs and other
intelligent systems to complete a given mission
DR “Degree of resistance”
FP Processor speed (instruction or operation)
FT Target frequency
GW Gross Weight
hi Time by i
th person on considered tasks, in hours
LOA Level of Autonomy
m Fraction of mission completed prior to premature
termination
mx Coefficients, defined in text
M Baseline “staffing” matrix
n Number of operations personnel
nx Coefficients, defined in text
NB Number of robotic behaviors
NC Number of control actuators
NDOF Number of degrees of freedom, robot mobility
NL Lines of software code
NM Size of system dynamic memory
NP Number of processors
NR Number of robots (and/or intelligent systems,
including autonomous aerial vehicles)
NRule Number of conditional (heuristic) rules
NS Number of sensors
NV Number of state space variables
o(t) Obsolescence of data product upon delivery
(hours)
P MTBF (mean time between failure) x mission
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090027657 2019-08-30T07:37:23+00:00Z
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duration
q Production quantity of HALE aircraft of a
particular type/mission
Q QFD-inspired technology-to-goals matrix
rt Resolution adequacy of target image (0 to 1)
R Factor for consequence of failure; values for types
of events: return to base = 0; damage to aircraft =
(cost to repair)/(vehicle cost); crash in
unpopulated area = 2 (loss of vehicle plus
retrieval costs); crash into urban area = 100
RC Control input rate
MROI Mission return on investment
st Clarity adequacy of target image (0-1)
S Mission success
t Specific target
T Mission duration
TO Set of observation targets defined by users (as
applied to wildfire surveillance missions)
TMi i'th case of M mission tasks (for multiple
coordinated flyers)
vt Value from perfect observation of target t
wi Wage of i
th person, $/hr
!i Weight factor reflecting importance of overall
mission task (as executed by multiple, coordinated
flyers)
"i success of individual task, (as executed by
multiple, coordinated flyers)
# Discount factor for data obsolescence (percent
loss value per hour)
$ Aerial vehicle intelligence metric
% Aerial vehicle autonomous system
implementation elegance metric
& Telecom relay messages per aircraft per day
' Station-keeping science observations per day
( Level of Autonomy (LOA), 0!(!5, “aleph”
Superscript:
* “Normalized” metrics of vehicle intelligence,
elegance, and degrees of inaccessibility, resistance,
and interaction, such that range of value of
parameters fall within 0 and 10.
Introduction
SYSTEM analysis is an essential technical discipline for the modern design of aerial vehicles and their
associated missions. Specifically, system analysis is a powerful aid in identifying and prioritizing the required
technologies needed for mission and/or vehicle development efforts. Maturation of intelligent systems technologies,
and their incorporation into aerial platforms, is dictating the development of new analysis tools, and incorporation of
such tools into existing system analysis methodologies, in order to fully capture the tradeoffs of autonomy on
vehicle and mission success. A first-order “system analysis of autonomy” methodology will be outlined in this
paper. Further, this analysis methodology will be applied to a set of notional high-altitude long-endurance (HALE)
uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) missions.
For planetary flight vehicles (PFV), a high level of autonomy is essential to accomplish their missions. The
substantial time delay in interplanetary communications makes aerial vehicle autonomy a necessity. For terrestrial
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV), though, autonomy (above that of teleoperation, or rather simple remotely piloted
vehicle capability) is not essential but, nonetheless, could be a powerful enabling technology. Other than the most
qualitative of assessments, how can cost/benefit analysis for incorporation of autonomous system technologies into
aerial vehicles be performed? The first step needs to be the definition of metrics for autonomy that are indeed
unambiguous and quantifiable.
Fundamental concepts such as autonomy, intelligence, and elegance for planetary flight vehicles (a.k.a. aerial
explorers) have been earlier presented1. In many respects, these autonomy metrics needed to be uniquely tailored
for aerial explorers. In the case of terrestrial UAVs, previously proposed2 autonomous control levels (ACL) have
been more generally accepted. The NASA Vehicle Systems Program (VSP) HALE Sector concluded that the
DOD/AFRL ACL were too extensive (too many and too nuanced) for the envisioned HALE science missions. A
simplified set of level of autonomy (LOA) metrics have therefore been adopted by the VSP HALE Sector.
Once having defined quantifiable autonomy metrics for UAVs, reasonable first-order functional relationships are
defined relating vehicle and mission characteristics to aforesaid autonomy metrics, and ultimately related to
individual autonomous system technologies. Hopefully, this preliminary “system analysis for autonomy”
methodology, though still somewhat conjectural, will serve as a starting point for a robust future discussion of an
important nascent area of engineering investigation.
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A. Autonomy - keep it simple
What is this “autonomy” all about? It is about taking the human out of the airplane. Not completely out of the
loop, but minimizing human involvement in the operation of the vehicle while providing enhanced mission
flexibility and vehicle robustness. UAVs will be operated for durations exceeding the physical capabilities of a
human operator and the cost of operating the vehicle can be minimized by reducing the work load required to a level
sufficient that numerous aircraft may be operated by a single operator. The AIAA defines autonomy as “A systems
own ability of sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting, to achieve its
goal as assigned by human operators”.23 However this does not provide the perspective for collaborative vehicle
operations where UAVs will eventually excel. To address this issue numerous organizations have attempted to
define autonomy in terms of a Level of Autonomy (LOA). In most cases the proposed LOA become complicated
and address vehicle capabilities beyond those needed for typical science and civil applications. Since no readily
applicable LOA definition existed that exactly matched the VSP HALE Sector envisioned operational aspects of
HALE UAVs, the Sector established its own definition.
Table 1 defines the LOA used by the HALE Sector to articulate its autonomy goals and objectives. Important in
the definition of the LOA is the concept of “hands-on-time”. Hands-on-time is defined as the percentage of a pilot’s
time (direct attention paid to the UAV) that would be required to safely operate the UAV during a given mission.
Hands-on-time is limited to the pilot/operator and does not include other mission personnel (e.g., sensor/payload
operator). Nominal values are presented in the table, actual hands-on-time will vary with the mission.
What are the primary autonomy enablers? To be able to fly in civil airspace you need an UAV system with a
demonstrated Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) as a manned system. It cannot cost any more to operate than a
manned system. In fact, one should be able to realize a cost reduction through automation. The primary challenges
(hurdles) to achieving these fundamental desired features are: system safety and reliability (addressing
airworthiness, sense & avoid, and validation & verification); fault tolerant system architectures (providing
robustness, situational awareness, automated operations); contingency management (fault detection, prognostics,
emergency procedures); and other miscellaneous factors such as software certification, ELOS certification, and Air
Traffic Management (ATM) interfaces with manned and other unmanned assets.
B. Various Notional HALE Missions and Overall Characteristics
The NASA VSP is in the process of completing a survey of potential civilian UAV missions – including High
Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) science platforms.16 Some of the notional missions are summarized in Table 2.
These representative missions will be referred to in later sections of the paper – particularly in the context of
benchmarking UAV autonomy metrics and establishing functional relationships for the proposed “system analysis
for autonomy” methodology.
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Table 1. Levels of Autonomy adopted by the VSP HALE Sector
LOA Level Description (Features) Sample Characteristics
0
Remote
Controlled
Remotely piloted aircraft with a human in the loop, making all
the decisions. Operator is in constant control. (100% hands-
on-time.)
> R/C airplane
1
Simple
Automation
Remotely piloted with some automation techniques to reduce
pilot workload. Human monitoring to start/stop tasks. (80%
hands-on-time.)
> Basic autopilot
2
Remotely
Operated
Human operator allows UAV on-board systems to do the
piloting. As part of the outer control loop, the human makes
decisions as to where to go, when, what to do once there.
Remotely supervised, with health monitoring and limited
diagnostics. Operator allows UAV to execute preprogrammed
tasks, only taking over if the UAV is unable or fails to
properly execute them. (50% hands-on-time.)
>Integrated Vehicle
Health Management
(IVHM)
> Onboard Contingency
Management
capabilities
> Waypoint navigation
3
Highly-
Automated
or
Semi-
Autonomous
UAV automatically performs complex tasks. System
understands its environment (situational awareness) and
makes routine decisions and mission refinements to
dynamically adjust to flight and mission variables. Limited
human supervision, managed by exception. Adaptive to
failures and evolving flight conditions. (20% hands-on-time.)
> Loss-link mission
continuation
> Automatic takeoff/land
> Adaptive control
techniques
> Reactive “search and
find” terrain recognition
4
Fully
Autonomous
UAV receives high-level mission objective (e.g., location,
time), translates them into tasks that are executed without
further human intervention. UAV has the ability and
authority to make all decisions. Extensive situational
awareness (internal and external), prognostics, and on-board
flight re-planning capability. Single vehicle operations. (Less
than 5% hands-on-time.)
> Automated in-flight re-
planning
> Mission sensor-directed
operations
5
Collaborative
Operations
Brings in aspects of multiple UAVs working autonomously
together as a collective intelligent system. Group
coordination. Individual vehicles/systems in a collaborative
group will have a least semi-autonomous LOA (3) to keep the
operator workload of the collaborative operation at a
manageable level. (Total hands-on-time for sum of all air
vehicles would not exceed a single operator hands-on-time of
100%.)
> Cooperative and
collaborative flight
> Mother- and daughter-
ship collaborative
operations
> Team leader concept for
cooperative systems
> Robotic swarms
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Table 2. Representative (Notional) HALE Missions
Telecom Relay Platform Mission/fight profile: transit from local commercial airport to station-keeping altitude
(>60K ft), long duration loiter (>30 days). Critical capability: flight endurance and payload capacity. Technical
challenges: power and propulsion; reliability. Autonomous system technology challenges: highly autonomous
operations during station-keeping, autonomous payload management, and health monitoring and prognostics of
flight systems. Automated piloting to and from station-keeping altitude. Risk/hazard: disruption of services.
Severe Storm-Tracker Mission/fight profile: launch/recovery from regional centers; mid-altitude
(40K<Alt<60K ft) long-range (>1000 km) cruise to operational area; increase altitude (>60kft) and engage/track
storm for duration (4 to 10 days). Critical capability: robust structural and aero-handling characteristics to fly in
moderate turbulence. Autonomous system technology challenges: adaptive flight controls (e.g., aero-handling,
potential control surface failure); science payload management; sensor/payload-driven in-flight re-planning (e.g.,
onboard lidar/radar tracking of immediate-vicinity storm patterns and velocity flow-fields) for flight path
management and goal-based decision-making. Risk/hazard: loss of aircraft due to severe weather conditions.
Border & Coastal Patrol Mission/fight profile: launch/recovery from a regional center, cruise at mid-altitude
(40K<Alt<60K ft), long-range (>1000 km), and moderate duration (4 to 10 days). Critical capability: stable flight
platform with high-resolution imaging/sensing capability and ability to traverse large survey areas. Autonomous
system technology challenge: science payload management; real-time re-planning; secure, high-bandwidth data
relay/networking. Risk/hazard: inability to acquire and transfer critical intelligence to appropriate decision-
makers in a timely manner. See Ref. 22.
Station-Keeping Science Platform - observation of persistent science phenomenon; e.g., monitoring volcanoes,
polar “ozone holes,” environmental effects of chemical spills and toxic ocean “blooms,” etc. Mission/flight
profile: deploy from national science centers, transit to station-keeping altitude (>60K ft), long duration loiter
(>30 days). Critical capabilities: long endurance, low-speed loiter capability coupled with large payload capacity.
Autonomous system technology challenge: automated mission operations during station-keeping including
science payload management. Risk/hazard: disruption of services.
Long-Range Science & Surveillance Platform - observation of transient and/or widely-distributed
phenomenon; e.g., damage surveys and coordination for large-scale disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes;
tracking migration patterns of animals/insects; mapping/measuring the spatiotemporal variation of air and ocean
currents; assessing compliance of international laws/regulations over international waters, e.g. prohibition on
whale harvesting. Mission/flight profile: long-range (>1000 km), moderate duration (4 to 10 days), moderate
altitude (40K<Alt<60K ft) cruise capability; navigation by pre-planned GPS waypoints and sensor/science-driven
decision-making. Autonomous system technology challenges: sensor/science-driven navigation and goal-based
decision-making. Risk/hazard: inability to acquire and transfer critical data/information to appropriate
users/decision-makers in a timely manner.
Sensor-Network Aerial Constellation - repeat pass interferometry (RPI), military and civilian search and find
(complementing manned rescue aircraft), dropsonde deployment. Mission/fight profile: multiple UAVs
conducting coordinated (simultaneous) flights to achieve single mission goal. Critical capability: near-real-time
or better fusion of data/information from multiple aircraft (and other assets). Technical challenge: repeated
precision over-flight of critical waypoints/trajectories. Autonomous system technology challenge: vehicle-to-
vehicle, vehicle-to-ground-control, and vehicle-to-other-intelligent-systems coordination (and in some cases
“negotiation”). Risk/hazard: operational difficulties in managing multiple assets; hazard/collision avoidance.
Wildfire Surveyor - satellite monitoring of critical areas is used to pre-plan and launch UAV assets from a few
national/regional centers to perform real-time monitoring of fire propagation as well as provide coordination
information for firefighting ground crews and manned aircraft; Mission/fight profile: high-speed (>100 knots)
mid- to high-altitude flight (40K<Alt<60K ft), long-range capability (>1000 km); short duration (1 day). Critical
capability: real-time re-tasking/re-planning. Technical challenge: cost-effective on-demand asset
reliability/availability. Autonomous system technology challenges: intelligent mission management; data &
information networking. Risk/hazard: inability to acquire and transfer critical intelligence to appropriate
decision-makers in a timely manner.
Aerial Explorers - planetary aerial surveys, surface interactive through drop probes and small robotic devices,
and possibly vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) capability. Non-GPS navigation required. See reference 1.
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By way of illustration, Fig. 1 is a notional concept of a 14-day endurance HALE platform being studied by the
NASA HALE Sector. Figure 2 is a notional concept of a 100-day endurance vehicle. The two notional HALE
flyers also represent a spectrum of mission capabilities, vehicle design, and technology challenges. Both of these
HALE platforms could satisfy a number of the Table 2 missions. The autonomous system technology challenges
will be the primary focus of discussion as related to these vehicles and their range of mission applications.
Figure 1. 14-day HALE Concept (Depicting over-flight of polar region)
Figure 2. 100-day HALE Concept (Depicting over-flight of hurricane)
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C. Fundamental Questions about UAV Autonomy
In respect to HALE UAV autonomy, there are several fundamental vehicle autonomy questions that need to be
addressed by system-analysis-type trade studies. Among these questions are:
• Is there a way to identify “breakthrough” UAV missions/applications where autonomy is a key
technology enabler?
• How much, and what type/level of, autonomy is appropriate for certain missions and applications?
E.g., is there a need for autonomous capability greater than teleoperation (i.e. remote-piloting) for
HALE UAV?
• For a given mission/application and appropriate associated autonomy level, what is the minimum
required level of intelligence and elegance (efficiency of the intelligence implementation/realization)
to yield acceptable mission success, cost, and reliability thresholds? What, if any, are the negative
consequences of building in too much autonomy and intelligence into an aerial vehicle?
Ancillary questions to the above cost/benefit question can be posed for certain intelligent sub-systems
above and beyond the vehicle autonomy implementation itself.
• How much cumulative “autonomous system technology” development cost is acceptable before
human operation is more cost effective?
• What is the breakeven cost for development implementation of intelligent onboard
prognostics/diagnostic systems, given certain assumed missions? And, further, what is the
breakeven cost of development and implementation of intelligent/adaptive flight control systems?
• What is the cost/benefit trade between autonomous system elegance (computational efficiency and
avionic system complexity) and vehicle reliability and safety?
D. HALE UAVs and the Impact of Autonomy
Autonomous systems technologies find their greatest utility not in just replacing onboard pilots, engineers, and
scientists with ground-based operators/monitors, but with expanding into new application domains and enabling
wholly new mission applications. A number of these new mission applications, both terrestrial and planetary, were
presented in Table 2. However, it is also important to note that the greatest impact of autonomous system
technology is not limited to its implementation on a single aerial platform, or even multiple versions of a single
vehicle type, but rather the greatest impact will result from the application of autonomy to heterogeneous robotic
systems working in cooperation/collaboration with each other to achieve mission success. Figures 3a and 3b show
two examples of the simplest form of cooperating system of robotic assets: the deployment of “intelligent”
dropsondes from a terrestrial UAV and mid-air-deployment of “robotic symbiotes” from a planetary aerial explorer.
Many such coordinated and cooperating systems of robots, including/incorporating UAV aircraft, can and have been
conceived in principle. In an ideal sense unmanned aerial vehicles do not merely replace manned aircraft, but are in
fact true aerial robots.
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Examples of Collaborative Operations: (a) dropsonde from HALE “storm tracker” and (b)
planetary aerial explorer and air-deployed robotic symbiote
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I. The Proposed Basic Methodology
The basic “system analysis of autonomy” methodology is outlined in this section. Figure 4 presents a high-level
flow chart of the proposed methodology. Each element of the method will be discussed in detail.
Iterate Vehicle/Mission Characteristics &
Technology Weightings
“UAV Turing
Test”
Statistical Assessment of
“Mission Success” Metrics
Given Mission Simulation
Results (Table 3)
Flight/Mission Simulations
(both autonomous &
fully “pilot-in-loop”)
Unique Vehicle/Mission Hazard
Assessment, Eqs. 20-21
Mission ROI Estimate, Eq. 3
Risk Assessment (Including Stochastic
Failure/Emergency Mode Sim Results)
Initial Vehicle/Mission Definition &
Technology Assumptions
Goals
Met?
No
YesProject Goals &
Mission ROI
“Closure” Achieved
Progress towards (%) HALE Project Goals Flows
From Successful Maturation of Autonomous
System Technologies, Eqs. 13-18
Defined Mission drives
Intelligence/Elegance Metrics, Eq. 12
Subject Matter Expert input
to estimates of $* & %*
High-Fidelity Definition of
intelligence & elegance, &
therefore $* & %*, Eqs. 1-2
Intelligence & elegance levels drive
specific autonomous system technologies,
Eq. 19 & Fig. 10
Autonomous system first-order cost, risk
(Eq. 5) & staffing (Eqs. 8-9) estimates
Non-autonomous system
vehicle life-cycle cost
(CER-based) estimates
Figure 4. System Analysis Flow Chart
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A. Statement of Problem
The problem to be studied is easy to describe but difficult to solve:
• First, what is the optimum level of vehicle autonomy and intelligence required for a particular HALE UAV
mission/application, so as to assure acceptable levels of success and safety while at the same time keeping
development and implementation costs to a minimum?
• Second, what are the specific attributes of an autonomous system implementation essential for a given
mission/application and aerial vehicle in order to maximize mission success?
The engineering community must be careful not to imbue systems with unnecessary, or otherwise inappropriate,
levels of autonomy and intelligence for the particular purposes to which they are applied. To draw on examples from
science fiction, there is no need for talking toastersa or smart bombs that pose existential questionsb. Similarly,
aircraft should not be able to decide that they would rather fly to Palm Springs than Seattle -- for the better weather -
- on any given day or flight. (Such decision-making freedom, though, may well be appropriate for a planetary aerial
vehicle, so as to enable “serendipitous science” and missions of opportunity.)
B. Concepts and Initial Metrics
Considerable work has been documented in the literature as to machine intelligence metrics; however, only
modest work has been dedicated to UAVs.20-21 Delving briefly into the autonomy versus intelligence debate,
autonomy is defined for the purposes of this paper as the ability to independently perform without human
intervention actions, tasks, or roles. Intelligence measures how well these actions, tasks or roles are performed
under varying degrees of task and environmental complexity and other associated constraints and conditions. And,
elegance is the computational efficiency by which the autonomous vehicle intelligence is implemented. Therefore,
it is wholly possible that two robotic systems can be at nominally equivalent autonomy levels but exhibit radically
different levels of intelligence. For example, one robot (aerial or otherwise) could perhaps only perform its tasks in
a simple invariant environment, whereas the other robotic system could perform those nominally same tasks in a
highly uncertain, unknown, or changing environment. The latter robotic system is clearly more intelligent than the
robot that can only successfully operate in the simpler environment, though their autonomy levels may be
equivalent. The following concepts and analysis builds upon earlier autonomous aerial vehicle work.1,11-14,18
In a simplistic sense, the definitions of intelligence and elegance used in this paper can be expounded upon
by examining the following relationships, Eqs. (1a-d), for a given set autonomy level:
RobotsofNumber
ComplexitylOperationa&talEnvironmen
SuccessMissionceIntelligen !)
Or, alternatively,
R
EO
N
SC
=$
Correspondingly,
RobotsofNumberComplexitySystemAutonomous
ceIntelligen
Elegance
!
)
a “Red Dwarf” BBC television show.
b “Darkstar” cinematic film.
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Or
RAS NC
$
% =
(1a-d)
Where for autonomy levels 3-5, at least, which is the primary focus of the current work, the following
holds true:
FrequencyTargetofInverse
nInteractioofDegree
ResistanceofDegree
ilityInaccessibofDegree
SensorsofNumber
RateInputControlRequired
ActuatorsControlofNumber
FreedomofDegreesMobilityRobot
ComplexitylOperationa&talEnvironmen
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
)
Or, alternatively,
T
IN
RISCCDOFEO
F
D
DDNRNNC =
And
SpeedOperationornInstructios)Processor(Mean
MemoryDynamicSystemofSize
ProcessorsofNumber
Rules)(HeuristicnalConditioofNumber
BehaviorsRoboticofNumber
VariablesSpaceStateofNumber
CodeSoftwareofLines
ComplexitySystemAutonomous
!
!
!
!
!
!
)
Or, rather,
PMPRuleBvLAS FNNNNNNC =
(2a-d)
Note that in the expression for “environmental and operational complexity” in Eq. (2a-d) the “degree of
inaccessibility” term can encompass many things. In its simplest form, it is equivalent to terrain ruggedness, i.e.
unity plus the variance of terrain elevation obscuring features of interest or impeding mobility (as in nap of the earth
flight). Also, the “degree of resistance” term can encompass many things, but, again in its simplest form, it is
equivalent to atmospheric turbulence, i.e., unity plus the variance in wind magnitude and direction as affecting the
ease of flight control. The “degree of interaction” term encompasses the physical (instruments, dropsondes, robotic
symbiotes, and other intelligent systems) and informational interactions of the aerial vehicle with objects/features of
interest on the ground or interactions with external intelligent systems and/or other members of a robotic ecosystem.
In its simplest form for aerial vehicles it is unity plus the resultant of the number of probes and symbiotes released
by the aerial vehicle times the post-flight “persistence” of those probes and symbiotes. Finally, the “inverse of target
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frequency” term, for discrete targets, is given by Actual
2 NRmax* (i.e., the inverse of the number of targets within, and
divided by, a maximum potential survey area described by a circle having a radius equal to the maximum range of
the aerial vehicle). Note, however, that alternate expressions are required for distributed and scarce targets.
“Mission return on investment” (MROI) can be expressed as
CostRisk
SuccessMission
+
=MROI
(3)
Note that for the special case of planetary science missions1 – where mission cost is effectively capped, the cost can
be treated as fixed.
An earlier discussion of risk and cost has been presented in the context of aerial explorers18, particularly as
related to the question of MSS versus FCL (Many, Simple, Small versus Few, Complex, Large) robotic exploration
systems. Based on this early work, a measure of mission “return” for a purely scientific endeavor can be defined
by the relationship (i.e. where mission success is proportional to the amount of information gathered):
Risk
GatherednInformatio
ReturnMissionMROI =,
(4a)
Where
Information Gathered =
Number of sensors
XMeasure of spatio - temporal dispersal of sensors
XMean sophistication of sensors
X Number of different types of sensors
X Ability to interprete/adapt given past results
X Ability to verify results
X Ability to cross - correlate independent measurements
(4b)
And the inverse of risk is
1 Risk =
1 - Mean probability of sensor failure( )
 X Mean probability of sensor successful dispersal
X Mean probability of communicating data back to Earth
(4c)
Table 3 notes a number of different measures/metrics for estimating/tracking mission success that can be
defined. Each mission application domain (niche) has its own unique mission success metric (though there are
certain common constituent elements). Assessing overall mission success needs to be established through a
combination of flight test and mission simulation. This will be discussed subsequently in the context of
autonomous system technology validation.
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Table 3. Mission Success Metrics for Various Notional Missions
Mission Mission Success Metric
Telecom Relay Platform qT&-SuccessMission
Storm-Tracker TDDDsrvc INRItttt'-SuccessMission
Border & Littoral Water Patrol
CItttt DTDsrvc +-'SuccessMission
Station-Keeping Science Platform Tsrv ttt'-SuccessMission
Long-Range Science Platform
CINtttt DTDsrvc +-'SuccessMission
Sensor-Network Aerial
Constellation21 Mission Success-Collaborative Gain= ! i
i=1
NR
. "iTM
i
Wildfire Surveyor17
Mission Success = vt
t=1
TO
. ctrtst (1/ #)o( t ) / hi + wi( )
i=1
n
. + P + R +Cv + m +Cm( )
0
1
2
3
4
5
Aerial Explorers1 HourPerFoundTargetsSuccessMissionceIntelligen --- CD
For PFVs, “mission success” as related to the intelligence metric is directly proportional to the
“discovery confidence” metric, DC, for aerial explorers working in (robotic) isolation
1.
Note that there are no upper bounds on the above definitions of the mission success, intelligence and elegance
metrics. Their maximum values are dependent upon a given set of vehicle, environmental, and mission
characteristics -- which, in turn, are subject to refinement as vehicle designs are matured, mission concept of
operations (CONOPS) are detailed, and system characteristics are predicted with improved fidelity
analysis/simulation tools and/or measured in flight. Though these autonomy metrics can and should be defined by
using the above detailed formulae, a simpler approach should be used when system analysis of vehicle/mission
concepts is to be performed. Therefore “normalized versions of system intelligence and elegance, $ * and %* , must
be defined where the normalized values fall within the ranges 0 6$ * 610 and 0 6 %* 610. That is, it is posited that
there are some notional normalization factors such that $ * )$ $Constant Factor and %
* ) % %Constant Factor wherein the
above range of values holds true for all realizable HALE UAV missions. In practice, neither quantitative estimates
of $ and %, or definition of actual values of $Constant Factor and %Constant Factor need be made in order to gain some
advantage from the concept of using normalized measures for these key parameters. The proposed “normalization”
is a pragmatic technique that allows engineering judgment to be used in the early stages of the system analysis
process, in place of making detailed but difficult estimates of vehicle intelligence and elegance using Eqs. 1-4.
Applying representative values for HALE UAVs, the following order of magnitude estimates for the environmental
and operational and autonomous system complexity can be made: CEO 7O(104) and CAS7O(1012) – assuming that
the dynamic memory is given in terms of MBytes and the processor speeds in GHz. Correspondingly, the
normalizing factors are approximately $Constant Factor 7 O 10
3( ) to O 104( ) and %Constant Factor 7O 10/9( ) to O 10/10( ). It is
to be expected (as somewhat analogous to human intelligence tests) that the intelligence and elegance metrics will
occasionally need to be re-normed with improved mission simulation and autonomous system development results.
Correspondingly, the degrees of inaccessibility, DI, degrees of resistance, DR. and degrees of interaction, DIN, can
also be “normalized” to range between the values of 0 to 10 and engineering judgment used in place of detailed
analysis and mission simulation to define these parameters.
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In the most global sense, mission success, risk, and costs are functions of not only the vehicle LOA, but also the
vehicle’s intelligence, $, and elegance, %, at a given LOA. Mission success, as noted earlier, can only be assessed in
terms of flight test and simulation. On the other hand, first-order parametric expressions can be posited for the
functionality of risk and cost with respect to a vehicle’s intelligence and the elegance of its autonomous system
implementation. Specifically, for the purposes of this exercise, it is conjectured that the functional forms for the risk
and cost metrics are, respectively, as follows:
Risk 7 x T( ) f $*,%*( )
(5a)
Cost 7 y T( )g $*,%*( )1+(( )
m0
(5b)
Where
f $,%( )=
a2 %
*( )
/n2
a1 + $
*( )
n1
+ a3 $
*( )
n3
(5c)
g $, %( )= c1 $
*( )
m1 %*( )
/m2
(5d)
And
x T( )=
T
MTBFVehicle + MTBFPayload + MTBFProviding Service/Data[ ]
(5e)
y T( )= Cv + Cm( )1+ a4
T
MTBFVehicle
8
9
:
;
<
=
(5f)
Note that T is the mission duration. The “non-autonomy-related vehicle, payload, or service interruption risks are
encapsulated in the functions x(T) and y(T), which are directly proportional to mission duration, T. In effect, Eq.
5a-f can be considered a generalization of early work for aerial explorers and planetary robotic systems1,18. In
particular, note the parallel between Eq. 5e, intended for terrestrial HALE-type UAVs, and Eq.4c for planetary aerial
explorers. In other words, the probability of sensor failure is analogous to the mean time between failure (MTBF)
for the payload system(s). The mean probability of unsuccessful sensor dispersal is analogous to the MTBF of the
vehicle (and/or mid-air-deployment of surface interactive payloads). And, finally, the mean probability of
unsuccessful data relay to Earth is analogous to MTBF related to service interruption for a terrestrial UAV. The
coefficients a1, a2, a4, n1 to n3, c1, m0 and m2 in Eq. 5a-f are initially assumed to be equal to unity (i.e. have a value of
one). Note though that a3«a2, in this case then a value was assigned where a3=0.005; this constant in the proposed
risk function, Eq. 5c, accounts for the possibility that the vehicle might unnecessarily be too “intelligent” for its
intended LOA and mission application. These constants will need to be validated in the future with acquisition of
vehicle/mission data from actual aircraft operational experience or mission simulations. Such a formulation suggests
that there is an optimal combination of aerial vehicle intelligence and elegance for a given LOA and mission
application to be sought by means of system analysis accounting for vehicle autonomy.
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Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the proposed trend of the risk and cost metrics, as a function respectively of UAV
normalized intelligence and autonomous system implementation elegance, at a given LOA. As can be seen in both
Figs. 5 and 6, increasing elegance, in general, reduces risk and cost. Increasing vehicle intelligence reduces risk
(except for the slight increase at the high values to reflect potential unnecessary levels of intelligence) but at a price,
increased vehicle cost.
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C. Autonomy, Operational Staffing & Ground Control Costs
Referring back to Table 1, the trade-off between vehicle autonomy and the amount of human operator “hands-
on-time,” H0, and the number of operators per aircraft, N0, can (using the VSP HALE Sector autonomous operations
goals and LOA definitions) be expressed in terms of the vehicle level of autonomy, (, as
H0 = h(( )= a0 + a1(+ a2(
2 + a3(
3
( ) ( )[ ]52 2100 /+//= ububbN
(6a-b)
Where the coefficients are given by a0=1.0, a1=-0.119, a2=-0.102, a3=0.018, b0=2, b1=1, and b2=0.5; the Eq. 6a
polynomial curve-fit coefficients are derived from least-squares regression of the Table 1 LOA operator “hands on
time” limits. The function u(x) is the unit step function, where if x is less than zero then u(x)=0, else u(x)=1.
Figure 7 illustrates the operator hands-on-time trend line.
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Figure 7. Prescribed Operator “Hands-on-Time” as a function of LOA
In order to estimate the consequences of UAV autonomy, intelligence, and elegance on overall personnel
requirements, and not just vehicle operators/pilots, it is necessary to define a baseline operational “staffing” matrix,
M, such that
=
=
=
=
<
;
:
:
:
:
9
8
)
DirectorslightPlanners/FMissionof#
sSpecialistPayloadof#
Monitors&EngineersFlightof#
OperatorsVehicleof#
M
(7a)
As a baseline, an operational “staffing” matrix makes a certain assumption as to level of autonomy, i.e. 2=(B .
This baseline operational staffing vector is populated by constants that are based on generic and/or approximate
characteristics of UAVs currently flying. For the purposes of this analysis, the M vector is populated as follows
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M,
b0
"1
"2
"3
8
9
:
:
:
:
;
<
=
=
=
=
(7b)
Where the constants in the vector M are "1=1, "2=1, and "3=1. Note that one might assume that the back-up
operator could as act as back-up flight engineer/monitor, however this individual is book-kept only under the
operator staffing. Alternate crew staffing can be implemented by changing the values ofM.
Now for a given LOA, intelligence, and elegance combination, the following staffing level can be estimated
Ni = 1/
b1
b0
u(/ 2 / i + 1+ e/b3$
* %*0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5+
b2
b0
u(/ 5/ i + 1+ e/b4 $
* %*0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
8
9
:
;
<
=
>
?
@
A@
B
C
@
D@
M i
(8)
The above relationship holds true for 0!i!4; when i=0 then Eq. 8 devolves to Eq. 6b. The newly introduced
constants are arbitrarily assigned to be b3=1 and b4=1. Note that N and M are in terms of number of operational
personnel per aircraft per operational shift. Equation 8 presupposes a priority phase-in of autonomous system
technologies into other operational roles beyond that of operator/pilots.
The HALE UAV maintenance manpower required is handled in a separate manner from that of the operational
staffing estimation, but the maintenance support estimates are also affected by autonomy considerations. In this
regard, the conventional approach (using a nominal maintenance man hour per flight hour, MMH/FH, multiplier) to
estimate maintenance labor costs8 is modified as follows
MMH
FH
=
($ * %* + b5
b6($
* %* +1
(9)
Where the constants are b5=18 and b6=1/9 (assuming a 50% reduction in maintenance labor costs as a consequence
of implementing high levels of autonomous system technology).
Finally it should be noted that the total number of operations staff per aircraft per operational shift is given by
the simple identity (where N is given by Eq. 8)
n = Ni
i
.
(10)
Figure 8 illustrates the operational staffing trend as a function of vehicle level of autonomy.
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Figure 8. Operational staffing
One UAV-unique technology that sees cost growth with increasing implementation of autonomous system
technology is the ground control station, at least at the low- to mid-ranges of such technology. At the highest level
of technology, where the vehicle basically runs itself, the need for ground-control sophistication decreases and costs
will correspondingly drop as well.
CGCS = a0GW
($* %*
u(/ 4( )($ *( )
2
+ a1
2
(11)
The basic functionality of the ground control station cost is to assume a conventional cost estimating relationship
(CER) approach of dollars per pound of vehicle gross weight, GW. As a baseline, the proportionality constant is
assumed to be a0=$1000/lbf (approximately half that of the vehicle avionics cost per pound value
8). However, this
simple relationship is also modified by a term accounting for some dependence on level of autonomy. Initially, it is
presupposed that including autonomy and overall intelligence into the HALE UAV increases the cost of the control
station (employing the logic that a complex system needs another complex system to monitor it, if nothing else);
however, at some breakpoint, the autonomy and intelligence of the vehicle becomes so great that the need/ability to
monitor/control the vehicle becomes less demanding and the control station costs begin to decrease. (The most
extreme example would be a PFV in which no real-time control is exerted over the vehicle and monitoring consists
primarily of one way data capture from the vehicle.) Note however that one might consider that increasing the
elegance of the autonomous system on the aerial vehicle would reduce the cost of the control station, as a simpler
but more robust system needs a less complex system to monitor it. Note that a constant value of a1=25 is suggested.
D. Relationship between Mission Requirements and Autonomy Requirements
Drawing upon the Table 2 mission descriptions and the Table 3 mission success metrics, Table 4 summarizes an
assessment, using engineering judgment at this point of the analysis, as to key operational/environmental parameters
that will be used shortly to postulate functional relationships between these parameters and metrics for HALE
platform intelligence and elegance.
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Table 4. Functional Relationship Assessment
Notional HALE Mission Planetary
(F=1) or
Terrestrial
(F=0)
Duration,
T (Days)
Alt.
(kft)
DI
*
(1-10)
DR
*
(1-10)
DIN
*
(1-10)
(
(1-5)
$E
(1/10) 
Telecom Relay Platform 0 30 60 1 2 2 4 2
Storm Tracker 0 4 40 3 7 3 4 4
Border and Littoral Water
Patrol
22
0 4 40 4 2 3 4 3
Station-Keeping Science
Platform
0 30 40 3 1 2 4 3
Long-Range Science Platform 0 4 40 3 5 4 5 4
Sensor-Network Aerial
Constellation
0 4 25 4 3 7 5 4
Wildfire Surveyor 0 1 25 3 3 2 3 3
Aerial Explorers
• ARES-type prescribed flight
paths15,19
1 0.04 3.28 2 2 1 3 3
• Search & Find
Behaviors11,13,14
1 0.33 1.64 4 4 2 4 5
• Surface Interactive – robotic
symbiotes12
1 30 0.66 6 6 7 5 7
• Surface Interactive –
VTOL18
1 90 0.033 7 8 8 5 8
As can be expected, the Table 4 values are only approximate descriptions of a broad range of possible mission
types. Resulting functional relationships have been derived on the basis of functional analysis using the Table 4
“data” – which in turn was derived using collective engineering judgment. Refer to the following:
$* = f F,T,Alt,DI ,DR ,DIN ,(( )
(12a)
Or, more specifically
( ) ( )( )
Tm
e
T
T
a
Altm
ea
Dm
ea
DaDauuaFua
IN
RI
3
6
2
5
*
1
4
*
3
*
210
*
1
11
)5(211
/
+
+
5
4
3
2
1
0 //+5
4
3
2
1
0 //+
++/+/++/7$
(12b)
Where the following constant values are suggested (so at to arrive at agreement with the Table 4 results): a0 = 1, a1 =
0.5, a2 = 0.25, a3 = 0.25, a4 = 0.5, a5 = 1, and a6 = 0.5; m1 = 0.5, m2 = 1000, and m3 = 10. Note that constants m2 and
m3 are relatively large and are used to scale T and Alt. Figure 9a-f illustrates the incremental normalized
intelligence metric trends with the key independent parameters.
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Figure 9a-f. Incremental Vehicle Normalized Intelligence Contribution from Key Mission Parameters: (a)
LOA, (b) DI, (c) DR, (d) DIN, (e) cruise altitude, & (f) mission duration
E. Individual Autonomous System Technologies & Achieving Autonomy Metrics & Goals
Relating the development progress and contribution of individual technologies, represented by the jth array
element *
jB , to the overall intelligence metric for autonomous aerial vehicles is performed as follows
B j
* =
W j
*B j +W0
*I j
*
S
W j
* +W0
*
for j"1
(13)
Where S is a normalized (S!1) “mission success” metric derived from mission simulations incorporating the
individual autonomous system technologies in specified set of vehicle/mission scenarios. Note that W0
* and *
jW
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comprise a set of weighting factor metric for relative weighting given to the two types of technology assessments
embodied in Eq. 13. The weight W0
* is given to the “objective” simulation-derived mission success technology
assessment. The weight *
jW is given to the technologist’s “self-assessment” of the normalized technology
readiness level (TRL) of the jth autonomous system technology implemented in the mission simulation,
jB , or as
otherwise denoted by
=
=
=
=
<
;
:
:
:
:
9
8
)
...
"9"bydividedTechnologyjththeofTRL
...
"9"bydividedTechnology1sttheofTRL
B
(14)
Note by definition that W0
* + W j
* = 2 must hold true for all technologies, i.e. all values of j. The weights
*
jW are
specified as follows, relying on the matrix Q, which in turn is derived from the QFD-inspired tabular matrix shown
in Fig. 10.
W j
* = aI j
* and I j
* = u 10
W j
WF
+ $ * / 9
0
1
2
3
4
5 (15a-b)
Where
( )Wmax=FW and W j = Q i, j
i
. (15c-d)
The constant a, Eq. 15a, is arbitrarily assigned to reflect the relative weight of *
jW with respect to W0
* ; a=1.0 is
suggested. The array W can be thought of as denoting the relative importance of each individual technology, based
upon the Q matrix input, as to contributing the overall goals of the project. This will be discussed further in the
analysis and results section. Note that during the course of flight tests and/or mission simulations (embodying the
autonomous system implementation), if an individual technology is not implemented then the “TRL” value of that
technology is set to zero (irrespective of its previously demonstrated, but not implemented in the current simulation
or flight test).
Autonomous System Technologies
1 … … … O
Q Matrix of Weights
Objectives:
1
…
…
N
Goals:
1
…
…
M
Figure 10a. General format of QFD-Inspired Tabular Matrix
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Reduce parasite drag by 40%; SOA: CD0 =
0.0206 (Helios @ Re = 750K). 0.13 0.13
Reduce drag-due-to-lift by 25%; SOA: Cdi =
0.0088 (Helios @ CL = 0.9). 0.25
Reduce airframe structure weight by 60%;
SOA: structure weight fraction = 0.33 (Helios). 0.08 0.08 0.08
Reduce airframe subsystem weight by 60%;
SOA: subsystem weight fraction = 0.12
(Helios). 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Increase packaging efficiency so as to achieve
Area-of-Wing-Planform/Area-of-Container >
2.0; SOA: 1.3 (ARES). 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Increase maximum lift @ relevant flight
conditions so as to achieve CLmax > 1.8; SOA:
~1.0 (ARES). 0.25
Achieve reliable (3-sigma) mid-air deployment
sequence meeting mission objectives; SOA: 2-
sigma (sounding-rockets). 0.25
Achieve reliable (3-sigma) ground-based
deployment sequence meeting mission
objectives; SOA: 2-sigma (manual launch
systems). 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Improve solar power generation so as to
achieve Power > 1500 W/kg, 275 W/m^2, Eff.
> 15%; SOA: 400 W/kg, 100+ W/m^2, Eff. >
8% (thin-film solar blanket). 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Improve energy storage specific energy &
efficiency so as to achieve SE > 1.0 net KW-
hr/kg & Eff. > 55%; SOA: SE = 0.25 net kW-
hr/kg & Eff. > 35% (Helios). 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Improve electrical to mechanical conversion so
as to achieve specific power Pshaft/Mass > 750
W/kg; SOA: ~430 W/kg (Helios). 0.13 0.13
Improve propulsor specific power so as to
achieve TP/Mass > 2000 W/kg; SOA: 1500
W/kg with Eff. ~ 85% (Helios). 0.25
Consumable System specific power of
Tpmax/Mass => 200 W/kg; SOA: 50
W/kg (Helios at 53,000 ft)
Increase powerplant specific power so as to
achieve P/Mass > 400 W/kg; SOA: 70 W/kg
(Helios). 0.13 0.13
Increase powerplant efficiency so as to achieve
Eff. > 45%; SOA: Eff. ~ 35% (GRC study). 0.13 0.13
Decrease propellant feed system (PFS) mass
fraction to < 0.2; SOA: 0.3 (GRC study). 0.13 0.13
Reduce blade low Re, compressible airfoil
profile drag by 50%; SOA: Cd0 ~ 0.06 to 0.1
(rotary-wing MAV and RC helicopters). 0.25
Reduce rotor induced drag by 30%; SOA: k =
1.2 to 1.3 (k ideal = 1.0, solidity ~ 0.08 for RC
helicopters). 0.25
Reduce vehicle parasite drag by 50%; SOA:
drag flat-plate area to rotor disk area ratio, f/A,
~ 0.1 (RC helicopters). 0.25
Mission Operations Cost (per flight hour)
=>$400; SOA: ~ $2000. 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Achieve comparable Equivalent Level of Safety
(ELOS) as manned systems; SOA: Reliability
99.999 (GA aircraft having 1.2 class A mishaps
per 100,000 flight hours). 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Reduce the level of human involvement in
vehicle operations to 0.25/vehicle; SOA:
2/vehicle (JUCAS/X-45A). 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Achieve mission-dependent success levels of
98%; SOA: >80% (general DOD operational
experience). 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Autonomous Mission Operations goal:
autonomous collaborative operations,
LOA 5, i.e. total hands-on-time for
multiple aircraft operations < 80%;
SOA: semi-autonomous/highly-
automated, LOA 3, i.e. single vehicle
hands-on-time < 20% (JUCAS/X-45A).
A
u
t o
n
o
m
y
Cruise L/D => 50 @ CL=1.0 & Re =>
500K; State-of-the-Art (SOA) ~ 31
(Helios) @ CL=0.9 & Re => 750K.
Empty weight fraction <= 25% @ W/S
< 1 psf & AR => 30; SOA ~ 45%
(Helios) @ W/S = 0.8 psf & AR = 30.
Regenerative Power & Propulsion
System; TPbal/Mass => 30 W/kg &
TPbal/Area => 50 W/m^2 @ 0 Deg.
Latitude, mission start Sept. 22,
60,000 ft; SOA ~ 15 W/kg & 35
W/m^2 (Helios).
Consumable System specific energy
=> 12 net kW-hr/kg; SOA: 8 net
kW/kg (GRC study).
Aerial explorer reliable deployment
systems, goal: 3-sigma; SOA: 2-sigma
(functionality for sounding-rockets).
Increase aerial Explorer (a.k.a.
planetary flight vehicle) maximum lift
capability, i.e. Max. Lift/Area-of-
Container (e.g. aeroshell) => 700
N/m^2; SOA: ~ 240 N/m^2 (ARES).
Develop
optimized or
active-control
of aero perf.
Develop Automated
Energy Storage
Systems & Power
Management
Technologies
Develop optimized,
multifunctional structures
Develop Human-System Interface for Efficient Robust Control of
Single/Multiple Vehicles, Payloads & Other Intelligent Systems
Develop Lightweight Miniature Robust
Integrated Avionics & Sensors
Develop Vehicle
Management System
(Planning/Decision-Making
& Task Execution) with
Situational Awareness &
Adaptability
Develop Control System
Approaches to Achieve Reliable
Autonomous Take-off and Landing
Develop Robust (Fault Tolerant)
System Architectures
Develop Hazard Sensing &
Avoidance System Concepts
Develop Intelligent Mission
Management Systems (with Auto-
Nav, Payload-Directed Tasking, &
Multiple Vehicle/System
Operations)
Develop Automated
Contingency Management
Concepts & Tools
A
i r
f r
a
m
e
P
o
w
e
r  
&
 P
r o
p
u
l s
i o
n
Aerial Explorer VTOL (as mission
appropriate) hover figure-of-merit
(ideal to actual power ratio) => 0.6 @
40K < tip Reynolds number < 100K
and 0.5 < tip Mach number < 0.7;
SOA: 0.4 to 0.5 (RC helicopter, low tip
Mach ~0.1); cruise L/D goal of => 3 @
advance ratio, mu, => 0.2; SOA: 2 to
3.
Figure 10b. A “House of Quality” QFD-Inspired Matrix for HALE UAV in terms of Autonomous System Capabilities
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Finally, the progress towards developing individual autonomous system technologies needs to be tracked
against progress towards overall programmatic goals/objectives (in so far as affected by those same autonomous
system technologies, and not other “extraneous” vehicle technologies). This is accomplished in the proposed
analysis by the following relationship for “fractional anticipated contribution to goal” array,
*
iC .
.=
j
jiii ,
* QCC
(16)
Where
*QBC =
(17)
Note that by definition, for a given i'th row of the matrix Q, the following holds true
. 6
j
ji 1,Q
(18)
It is appropriate to examine these notional vehicle/mission autonomous system capabilities in the context of a
matrix inspired by Quality Function Deployment (QFD) “house of quality” matrix representation3-6 – refer to Fig.
10. The contents of this matrix naturally flow from the goals, objectives, technical challenges, and approaches (as
derived by the well-known “GOTChA” process) developed and vetted by the VSP HALE Sector with appropriate
review from NASA independent reviewers, industry and academia.7 Note that the matrix columns represent the
definition of a detailed technology capability set -- as affected (and only affected) by autonomous system technology
-- consistent and supportive with respect to the HALE-sector-team-identified technical approaches.
Note that the initial weighting factors, Qi,j, used in the Fig. 10 QFD-inspired matrix can be determined as per Eq.
19. This initial weighting factor scheme assumes that contributing autonomous system technologies all
uniformly/equally contribute to the i'th Goal with the nominal partitioning between enabling (A=1) and contributing
technologies (A=0.25).
Goalithtoogy,th technolj'includinges,TechnologiSystemAutonomousngContributiofNumber
,
A
ji =Q
(19)
Subsequent iterations on the Fig. 10 weighting factors can be adjusted to reflect sensitivity analysis results and/or
mission simulations that show that autonomous system technologies do not uniformly contribute to the goals.
Additionally, the weighting factors can also reflect resource/funding issues that may not fully stem from engineering
considerations alone (i.e. not all promising technologies may be funded at the required levels, or funded at all, to
achieve the anticipated contributions to the technology goals).
F. Other Considerations in UAV Autonomy
Finally what is also required to help evaluate UAV autonomous system capabilities is essentially a “Turing
Test”9 for autonomous aerial vehicles. Such testing would have to be conducted by means of extensive mission
simulations of the vehicle under the guidance of its autonomous system software. Such autonomous vehicle mission
simulations would also have to be benchmarked against missions “flown” with pilots/human-operators in the loop.
In turn, scoring criteria for such testing could be based upon 1. overall mission success metrics (defined as in Table
3) and 2. by “handling quality” metrics similar to the well-known Cooper-Harper10 pilot ratings used for manned
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aircraft. Autonomous aerial vehicles would be considered to have successfully passed this “UAV Turing Test” if
the aggregate mission success and handling qualities for the autonomous aerial vehicle matched or exceeded the
equivalent metrics for missions conducted with pilots/human-operators in the loop.
Table 5. Notional “UAV Turing Test” Comparison
Flight Phases Mission ”X” –Autonomous Mission “X” – “Piloted”
Take-off (with x% probability – Gaussian
distribution – of runway abort)
…
Navigating and flying waypoint-to-waypoint
trajectories within prescribed precision
…
Landing (with z% probability of final
approach abort)
Alternatively, a third-party knowledgeable observer could provide the “UAV Turing Test” ratings of whether a
vehicle is autonomous or “piloted” (i.e. “check” the boxes in Table 5). This observer/rater would also have the
additional role of being able to override the scripted mission scenario and instigate failure modes and change of
flight profile/plans. If the majority of tasks are rated as “piloted” by the observer, when in reality the
vehicle/simulation is fully- or semi- autonomously controlled, then the vehicle/simulation “passes” the “UAV
Turing Test.” In this regards, this “UAV Turing Test” approach is more consistent with Turing’s original
“imitation game” proposal.9
Finally, as was noted earlier, system analysis of autonomous systems should consider and address first-order
concerns regarding unique UAV operational hazards in order to examine reasonable trades between the vehicle
LOA, intelligence, and elegance. Therefore, the appropriate questions are as follows. What then are the unique
consequences of the autonomous system failure, versus human operator error, for the UAV, the mission, and
collateral human/property damage? A corollary to this question is, are there unique hazards for autonomous HALE
UAVs versus (remote-piloted) human operation, or is it merely a question of relative respective probabilities of
occurrence for a commons set of hazards? The short answer is that both occur – there are some unique hazards as
well as many other hazards where it is only a matter of relative probability between a hazard seen by a piloted
(human-occupied) versus autonomous aerial vehicle. This issue is further complicated by the fact that many manned
aircraft have, or will have, highly automated sub-systems onboard them, resulting in a grey area as to what is a
“unique UAV hazard,” at least as far as autonomous systems technologies are concerned. Table 6 is a representative
subset of the operational hazards associated with manned aircraft versus uninhabited aerial vehicles, as influenced
by autonomous system technologies.
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Table 6. Uniquely Human versus Autonomous System Operational Hazards
Category Probability Hazard Hazard Control(s)
Uniquely Human Hazards --
I See note
below*
Errors in judgment due to human
(pilot, engineer/tech support
staff, payload specialists, etc.)
fatigue or work overload.
1. Implement ergonomic human-factor friendly
interfaces and control and decision-making tools
2. Implement balanced portfolio of autonomous system
technologies on the vehicle and in ground-control
II * Mission failure, or reduced
operational value (e.g. missed
opportunities), as a consequence
of inadequate response time for
human mission planners to
discuss/achieve consensus.
1. Enhance/augment human mission planners with
intelligent mission management tools
2. Implement internet-like data/information networking
to maximize efficiency of the mission planner decision-
making process (making sure all vested interested are
represented in real-time despite geographic distribution)
I * Mission/vehicle loss, or reduced
operational value, due to
inadequate reaction time for the
pilot to interpret advanced (non-
visual) sensor suite input to
maintain adequate vehicle
control
1. A key justification for the use of autonomous UAVs
for high-risk military or public missions
2. “Pilot-in-the-loop” simulations examining sensor
fusion and display(s) during relevant mission scenarios
including adverse weather conditions (e.g. low-visibility)
and/or extreme operating conditions (e.g. high-speed,
low-altitude flight).
II See note
below†
Mission abort/failure under
special circumstances where
vehicle (& occupants) can not be
treated (as needed) as
expendable
1. Another key justification for use of UAVs in high-risk
military or public good missions
2. Costly reliance on other assets (e.g. ground troops,
artillery, and air-suppression for military missions) to
reduce aircraft and aircrew risk down to acceptable levels
… … … …
Unique Autonomous System Hazards --
I * Vehicle, or mission loss, due to
improper/inadequate software
programming & testing
1. Adoption of formal software validation and
verification processes
2. Rigorous “hardware-in-the-loop” ground-testing
3. Extensive mission simulations (especially when
mission includes flight in unknown/uncertain
environments and/or non-deterministic autonomous
decision-making processes are employed)
II † Improper execution of flight
behaviors/tasks as a consequence
of using nondeterministic
(stochastic or heuristic) vehicle
decision-making processes
1. Use non-deterministic processes (hardware/software)
when only absolutely essential to assure mission success
2. Tightly/deterministically constrain the limits of action
(task execution) that can be effected by non-deterministic
processes (i.e. “idiot-proof” the actions/controls that are
commanded/tasked by the nondeterministic processor)
II † Improper implementation of
adaptive flight control
techniques (with either micro-
flow control actuators or
conventional control surfaces),
especially under highly degraded
vehicle operating conditions
1. Extensive ground-test and wind-tunnel testing;
coupled with flight test envelope expansion that carefully
examines adaptive flight control techniques/actuators –
including simulated vehicle/actuator failures and
performance degradation
2. Incorporation of high (& costly) risk margins for
aircraft hardware/systems as a contingency to restrained
use of adaptive flight control techniques
I * Flight load limit excursions, or
unanticipated system failures,
because of an improperly
functioning intelligent vehicle
system management system.
1. Adoption of formal software validation and
verification processes
2. Rigorous “hardware-in-the-loop” ground testing of
intelligent vehicle system management systems (e.g. load
limiting avionics, health monitoring and prognostics).
… … … …
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Note, the following are definitions of the above severity categories and hazard probabilities:
Category I. “catastrophic,” II. “critical,” III. “marginal,” and IV. “safe.” (or, rather, let C=(5-1)=4,
(5-2)=3, (5-3)=2, and (5-4)=1); Probability levels of “probable,” “remote,” “improbable,” and
“highly improbable” (or a value of P is assigned such that it falls within the discrete ranges of
0.1!P!1.0, 0.01!P!0.1, 0.001!P!0.01, and 0!P!0.001 – which is more consistent with an
experimental flight test program and not production aircraft). Further, note that: *approximate
probabilities can be assigned on the basis of existing (though perhaps with limited operational
experience) manned and UAV aircraft, and †these probabilities can only be assessed as
developmental experience with individual autonomous system technologies (for a given vehicle-
type and mission) are gained.
The Table 6 hazards are at a fairly high level. Ideally, each of the individual technologies identified in the Fig.
10 tabular matrix should have its own one or more specific hazards associated with it. The results of such an
expanded detailed technology/hazard analysis can be recast to the following matrix form for subsequent analysis.
H =
1st Hazard ... jth Hazard ...
1st Technology C + P ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
ith Technology ... ... C + P ...
... ... ... ... ...
8
9
:
:
:
:
:
:
;
<
=
=
=
=
=
=
(20)
Given the above, the individual technology hazard rating, accounting for technology maturation/readiness, is given
by
H i
* = H i, j
j
. B i*
(21)
Where the individual developmental progress made towards an (i'th) autonomous system technology,
*
iB , is given,
as earlier, by Eq. 13. The smaller the value of
*
iH , then the smaller the overall hazard for a given autonomous
system technology, at its current demonstrable (at least in terms of simulation, that is) technology
readiness/maturation.
Finally, to complete this discussion of vehicle/mission hazards, it is important to note that the cost/risk trade
between using manned aircraft versus UAVs for identical/similar missions is an important area of investigation but
outside the scope of this paper. Such cost/risk trades inevitably have to address cost metrics related to the potential
loss of manned aircraft (with attendant loss of crew and passengers) which, in turn, would need to address both
“actual” versus “perceived” costs and benefits. These types of trades studies are really only applicable for military
missions or high-risk, public-good, life-saving disaster-relief or other emergency missions where risk to the vehicle
(and crew if applicable) must be traded against the “higher good” of rescuing fallen comrades or saving lives. And
yet, UAVs may find their greatest utility under just these circumstances. As such, future system analysis work
should be devoted to examining these types of issues.
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II. Analysis and Preliminary Results
The above outlined methodology for incorporating autonomous system technology considerations into aerial
vehicle system analyses is very conjectural at this current stage of development. Validation of key assumptions and
functional trends clearly needs to be performed as a next step.
The HALE technologies being developed by the NASA VSP are focused on enabling new mission capabilities.
A mission level perspective is necessary to truly capture the importance and impact of these technologies. Short of
conducting actual mission demonstrations, the best way to analyze the role of these new autonomous systems
technologies in contributing to mission success is through mission simulations. Mission simulation capability is
especially important in the case of autonomous systems technologies where it is not the traditional aircraft
performance metrics (speed, range, endurance, etc.) that are impacted but mission level performance. Simulation
modeling needs to be developed to assess the performance of HALE and PFV vehicles and technologies in "real
world" application so as to both demonstrate the overall mission capabilities and track the benefits of technologies
under development.
Some initial insights into the optimum level of vehicle autonomy and intelligence required for a particular HALE
UAV mission/application can now be made, given the work presented so far. As noted earlier, whatever attempt to
optimize vehicle performance in the context of vehicle autonomy and intelligence has to also allow for acceptable
levels of success and risk while at the same time keeping development and implementation costs to a minimum.
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the general return on investment trends for autonomous aerial vehicles performing
commercial mission applications. The MROI trends are shown as a function of mission duration and whether or not
mission success is fixed-rate revenue (as a function of time) or fixed price per mission. Commercial HALE UAV
“mission return on investment” will always be related ultimately to revenue and dollars. MROI, in this case, is
relatively easy to interpret. The MROI concept is somewhat harder to interpret when the return is not in terms of
revenue but scientific information/opportunities.
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Figure 11. Return on Investment Trend as a function of Mission Duration (without cost penalty for increased
launch/recovery frequency for shorter duration missions & LOA = 4)
LOA = 4
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One of the key observations to note in Fig. 11 is that there is an optimum peak in MROI with respect to the vehicle
normalized intelligence metric; this is driven by the associated increase in risk and cost in having too much
intelligence unnecessarily built into the vehicle to accomplish its given mission. The MROI trend results
(accounting for risk as well as cost) for Fig. 11 do not incorporate a cost penalty for increased launch/recovery
frequency for shorter duration missions. As such the Fig. 11 results show the shorter-duration aircraft (with more
sorties) having higher MROI than the longer-duration aerial vehicle; this is direct consequence of the anticipated
higher development costs and risks (associated with decreased reliability over longer time) for longer-duration
vehicles. The MROI trend for the shorter-duration aircraft should shift downward somewhat when the cost penalty
for launch/recovery frequency is accounted for.
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Figure 12. Mission Return on Investment Trends: Mission Success is directly proportional to (a) Mission
Duration and (b) Fixed Mission Revenue (mission duration = 10 Days and LOA = 4)
Figure 12 illustrates the influence of mission success (and its overall functionality) on MROI -- in this case in the
context of fixed-rate revenue which is dependent on mission duration and a fixed-price per mission revenue. In this
particular case, Fig. 12, the fixed-price per mission charged is too low and is not competitive with respect to fixed-
rate per day pricing. The decision to pursue fixed-price versus fixed-rate pricing for commercial HALE UAV
missions will be strongly influenced by the risk assumption for successfully sustaining over the complete planned
duration of the mission.
Ultimately the cost associated with “autonomous system technology” development and implementation is only
cost-effective in the context that reductions in operational staffing costs and maintenance manpower costs are
sufficient to offset the increased vehicle development costs attributable to vehicle autonomy. Figure 13 and 14
present cost estimate trends for HALE UAV missions.
Mission Duration = 10 days
LOA = 4
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Figure 13. Cost Trend Estimates (LOA=4, Elegance=5, Aircraft Projected Life = 10 years, and Aircraft
Fractional Usage = 0.66)
Figure 13 presents the incremental costs associated for aircraft and mission, the ground control station (GCS),
the operational staffing costs (in lieu of manned aircraft crew costs), and aircraft maintenance manpower. Next to
the vehicle costs, maintenance manpower costs dominate – followed by operational staffing and GCS costs. Longer
duration aircraft will create significant technical challenges to achieve the necessary reliability levels; achieving
such reliability will dictate new autonomous system technologies with nontrivial development costs.
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Figure 14. Operational Staff and Maintenance Manpower Cost Trends as a function of Aircraft Projected
Life (baseline trends: $*=%*=1; minimum trends: $*=%*=10)
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
29
Figure 14 presents the cumulative operational staffing and maintenance manpower cost trends as a function of
aircraft life. The difference between the “baseline” and “minimum” cost trends represents the potential cost savings
for implementing pertinent autonomous system technologies.
What are the specific attributes of an autonomous system implementation essential for a given
mission/application and aerial vehicle in order to maximize mission success? The results in Figs. 15-18 are drawn
from, and are therefore consistent with, the numeric data contained within the QFD-inspired tabular matrix, Q,
shown in Fig. 10, given Eq. 19. The resulting distribution of Fig. 15 is a consequence of both the usage of uniform
weighting of technologies contributing to an individual goal, as well as relative scaling of “enabling” versus
“contributing” technologies within Q.
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Figure 15. Prescribed relative importance of individual autonomous technologies
Given the uniform weighting used in the Fig. 10 tabular matrix, the most important (relatively speaking) are the
technologies associated with the development and control of optimized multifunctional structures, and optimized
and/or active-control strategies for vehicle aero-performance. Given the Q matrix derived from Fig. 10, the (number
of funded) technology portfolio – as a function of the vehicle normalized intelligence metric -- is shown in Fig. 16.
A more monotonic trend is desirable from a technology portfolio perspective – versus the near-exponential trend
seen in Fig. 16. This will, in turn, dictate a future revisiting of the imposed uniform weighting in the Q matrix.
Referencing Fig. 10 –
Most important technologies (based on Q
matrix) are found related to distributed
control & usage of multifunctional structures
& active control of vehicle aero-performance
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Figure 16. Portfolio assessment of technologies as a function of normalized intelligence metric target
Given an autonomous system technology portfolio assessment such as summarized in Figs. 15-16, running
assessments can be made (based on concurrent mission simulation results) as to individual technology’s anticipated
fractional contribution to the goals (or more correctly the objectives intrinsic to the goals). Figures 17 and 18 show
notional results for such a fractional contribution to goals assessment for two levels of self- and objective- estimates
of individual technology progress. Figure 17 shows the progress made on an initial portfolio of high-priority
technologies towards the vehicle/mission goals given a relatively low TRL and mission success metrics from early
technology development efforts and mission simulation results. In Fig. 17 there are clear examples of where goals
are not being met at the current normalized intelligence metric design target and the current self- and objective
assessments of technology readiness/progress.
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Figure 17. Progress towards objectives and goals (uniform technology self-assessment of TRL=4, mission
simulation measured normalized mission success of S=0.25, and normalized intelligence metric target of $*=7)
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Figure 18 illustrates a fractional contribution to goal assessment based on a notionally somewhat larger (in
terms of a higher-priority portfolio) and more mature set of autonomous system technologies (from the Fig. 10 Q
matrix). In this example, goals are being more uniformly and consistently met. There are still, though, clear
examples of where improved technological progress could be achieved relevant to the goals.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Individual Technology Objectives (Mapping to Goals)
F
ra
ct
io
n
a
l
A
n
it
ic
ip
a
te
d
A
u
to
n
o
m
o
u
s
S
y
st
em
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
to
O
b
je
ct
iv
es
(&
T
h
er
ef
o
re
G
o
a
ls
)
Figure 18. Progress towards objectives and goals (uniform technology self-assessment of TRL=4, mission
simulation measured normalized mission success of S=0.5, and current normalized intelligence metric target
of $*=9)
This concludes a very brief summary of the type of system analysis that can be performed in support of
autonomous system trade studies for HALE UAV platforms. Considerably more work remains to be performed –
particularly in terms of validation and detailed mission assessments. This work will hopefully be recognized as an
important first step in a new sub-domain of system analysis.
III. Concluding Remarks
The first step in solving a problem is to pose the right questions to ask and to investigate. A set of such
questions has been posed in this paper for preliminary investigations into the impact of autonomous system
technology on uninhabited aerial vehicles and HALE missions in particular. Additionally, a preliminary
methodology for system analysis incorporating/considering autonomous system technology issues into the study of
overall aerial vehicle capabilities and mission requirements has been outlined. In order to perform this system
analysis it was critical to define autonomy metrics that were both quantifiable and practical. Additionally, first order
functional relationships were proposed that related these autonomy metrics to vehicle characteristics and mission
requirements. Finally, the contribution of individual autonomous system technologies (of which a large set were
identified) were related in both a conceptual as well a quantitative sense to high-level programmatic goals, mission
cost, risk, and return on investment criteria. All of this work is still fairly conjectural at this stage, though.
Considerable work remains in order to arrive at a validated set of system analysis tools for UAVs and other
automated and intelligent systems.
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